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Artworks and their Revolutionary Potential: the Role of Ambiguity

The potential of an artwork to inspire movement toward liberation and revolution lies in the artwork's ability to distort established social norms and laws such that the presumed objectivity and necessity of such norms and laws are rendered ambiguous, allowing for reflection that is free from the presumed necessity and the possibility of originating decisions on the part of the artwork's audience. Ambiguity can produce an experience of freedom from social expectations, thus, ambiguity creates the possibility of revolutionary change. Explicitly, yet coming from diverse viewpoints, Jean-Paul Sartre, Herbert Marcuse, Julia Kristeva, and Jean-François Lyotard commonly assert that artworks have the potential to disrupt, disturb, destroy, and annihilate social norms, language (the symbolic realm), and laws. Both Martin Heidegger and Walter Benjamin, on the other hand, address the fact that artworks have the potential to unite a people. Of course, Heidegger's view addresses the ontic and ontological structures of experience that makes possible the unification of a people, while Benjamin warns against an artwork's potential to unite a people because he fears fascist propaganda, which many people enjoy without recognizing that it is propaganda, i.e. aestheticized politics.

By way of the mentioned philosophers' ideas, it is argued here that an aesthetic experience that produces the possibility for a revolutionary decision must be an experience of something that renders ambiguous some aspect of average everydayness (in the Heideggerian sense). In the face of an ambiguity, which negates the presumed necessity of average everydayness, the audience asserts itself *against* the ambiguity thereby freely entering into the possibility of choosing something that is not of the current world, but that aims at its destruction, thus, the audience's assertion against the perceived ambiguity creates the possibility for a revolutionary transformation. The audience can affirm that the

ambiguity is an ambiguity and nothing else, or the audience can affirm that the artist intended to satirize or distort some aspect of existence, or that the ambiguity opens up a new possible mode of existence, which the audience can choose, and if they do, they enter into a revolutionary mode of being because they enter into the truth of the artwork such that the artwork's freedom achieved by negating average everydayness is affirmed by the audience who aim toward the appearance of freedom as it shows up in the artwork. No matter how the audience reacts, the experience of the negation of average everydayness occurs such that the presumed necessity of average everydayness becomes acknowledged as that *against* which one could freely act.

Herbert Marcuse argues, in *The End of Utopia*, that “the social agents of revolution...are formed only in the process of the transformation itself, and one cannot count on a situation in which the revolutionary forces are there ready-made, so to speak, when the revolutionary movement begins”.¹ In other words, Marcuse defines an event as revolutionary only if that event *does not* employ or subscribe to the current socio-political and economic world. If we continue to need and act in the current world as it is, living in it and according to it without questioning it, it is erroneous to speak of such acts as revolutionary.

In *The Problem of Violence and the Radical Opposition*, Marcuse distinguishes two types of violence in society, one of which is necessary for revolutionary liberation from repression. He states,

The recognition and exercise of a higher right and the duty of resistance, of civil disobedience, is a motive force in the historical development of freedom, a potentially liberating violence. Without this right of resistance, without activation of a higher law against existing law, we would still be today at the level of the most primitive barbarism. Thus I think that the concept of violence covers two different forms: the institutionalized violence of the established system and the violence of resistance, which is necessarily illegal in relation to positive law.²

Institutionalized violence justifies its own existence based on its having established the structures of society; it justifies itself because it sustains institutions. Yet, resistance is justified insofar as it contributes to the development of freedom, which means that even though whatever violently resists the

state is judged illegal and faces the possibility of dreadful repercussions, resistance is justified by a “higher right”: the right to fight for freedom. Marcuse argues, though, that if the “right of liberation is sacrificed to the right of the established order”, the revolution would already be a failure.³ So, Marcuse concludes that we must not preach nonviolence nor sacrifice our right to liberation because doing so “reproduces the existing institutionalized violence”.⁴ That is, only a violent resistance can usurp the dominance of the repressive system.

Artworks, in light of Marcuse’s explanation of resistance as negation and its relationship to violence, provide an answer to the question of non-violent resistance. The question, can resistance be non-violent, is answered in the affirmative, if we distinguish between physical violence and psychological violence. Artworks are a means of revolutionary transformation because they potentially express a world that has not already existed, but that can be conceptually construed and, possibly, put into practice. That is, an artwork can put a person’s understanding of the world and what it means into disarray, upsetting the person’s world-view to such an extent that the person is unsettled and experiences discomfort – the artwork violently causes the person's world to fall apart. The world of an artwork’s audience is experienced as necessary, but the artwork produces discomfort with that necessity by rendering an audience's relation to it ambiguous and this ambiguity leads to the audience’s being prompted by the artwork to face a question of social transformation. Artworks reveal the possibility of other worlds, not by presenting them to us, but by showing us that the current world has an ambiguous foundation, in linguistic, conceptual, and semantic terms. How an audience answers the ambiguity presented, and whether they answer it at all, determines the extent to which an intention to revolt successfully results from an artwork. That is to say that not all artworks that could lead to a revolutionary decision will do so because not all members of an audience will decide to embrace the negation of the presumed necessity of average everydayness, or perhaps they will not even notice that the artwork negates this presumed necessity.

An example is a music video composed by Coldcut (Matt Black and Johnathon More) and titled *Re: volution*.⁵ Matt Black describes the work as a “celebration/diss [read as: ‘attack on’]...UK politics and the 2001 election. An audiovisual PARTY political broadcast cutting up your fav[orite] enemies over a steaming punk jungle...stomper.”⁶ The video is a barrage of political images coupled with clippings from newspaper articles related to the images, most of which are testaments to the less than honorable events in the lives and works of particular British politicians. The artists’ aim was to comment on the unfortunate nature of the 2001 elections, which they describe as being like “voting with a gun to your head” because none of the candidates were desirable.⁷ The song includes, notably, British Prime Minister Tony Blair declaring that “the lunatics have taken over the asylum!” At this point, the music video has a fairly clear political message: particular British politicians are lunatics and the lunatics are running the asylum. The song’s so-called “celebration” of UK politics is at the same time a “diss” insofar as celebrating the politicians involves nothing other than recognizing their less than honorable conduct.

Later, Paul Miller, also known as DJ Spooky that Subliminal Kid, incorporated the song into a mixed CD that he produced for *Adbusters*, a magazine whose mission is to “topple existing power structures and forge a major shift in the way we will live in the 21st century”.⁸ Miller synthesizes the song with edited portions of George W. Bush's speech from September 11, 2001: “Freedom itself was attacked this morning...and freedom will be defended...I want to reassure the American people...that the full resources of the federal government will go to help any apparent terrorist attack on our country.” Miller retained, in his remix of Coldcut’s song, Blair’s exclamation that “the lunatics have taken over the asylum!” The ambiguity that provides the possibility for a potential decision not determined by the average everyday lies in the question: who is Miller portraying as the lunatics, the terrorists or the Bush Administration? The answer is not as clear as it was with Coldcut's music video, since no video exists for Miller's remix that makes obvious who he intends to belittle. Miller’s remix of Coldcut’s *Re:*

volution ambiguates the everyday distinctions between terrorists and politicians because either could be the lunatics who have taken over. The audience must make its own decision, which is political in nature, and, depending on who one decides the lunatics to be, one sets oneself either on the side of the administration and the lunatics are the terrorists, or one sets oneself on the side of the terrorists, believing that the lunatics are the politicians who have taken over the world. The latter is revolutionary insofar as that belief resists institutionalized violence, but it is disturbing to consider oneself as sharing an opinion with or as making a decision that could be described as a decision made by terrorists. The disturbance of this choice is the functional result of the ambiguity of the artwork, which produces the possibility for the revolutionary decision.

This artwork's content has obvious, everyday meanings that become distorted due to the structure of that content. We have certain ideal-types in mind when we think stereotypically of politicians, terrorists, and lunatics. If we think of politicians as those who typically are, or at least are supposed to be, capable of maintaining the appearance of the totalizing political institution's necessity, then when artists represent the role of those politicians in such a way that there is a breakdown of meaning, then the audience is forced to make its own decision or accept the ambiguities faced, but possibly could also remain indifferent to them. By rendering ambiguous the intended meaning of certain aspects of that which presumably necessitates the totalizing institutions, artworks can make possible the opportunity to rethink the social world, though there is no guarantee that any audience will have such thoughts as a result of the artwork.

Turning back now to the philosophers listed above, I will delineate the philosophical explanations that support the claims just made. Sartre is famously known as a philosopher of violent revolution and its justifications. He claims that a person "is the being through whom nothingness comes to the world" and that, by perceiving Being as a totality, a person can "put himself outside of Being and by the same stroke weaken the structure of the being of Being".⁹ Humans can bring what does not exist

into existence.¹⁰ In order to do so, a person can de-totalize the totality of Being by putting it into question, and negating it, such that new possibilities of the being of Being reveal themselves. An artist in particular brings what does not exist into existence by intentionally manipulating and breaking the totalizing character – the authoritative cohesiveness – of everyday language. Sartre explains this in *What is Writing?* He argues that colors, objects, and sounds are treated by artists as *things* that are transformed into *imaginary* objects.¹¹ The artist deals with meanings, but only such that the artist, the poet in particular, “considers words as things, not as signs”.¹² Everyday meanings are used as objects that, when incorporated into an artwork, become something other than they original were. Miller utilized the everyday meanings of a few particular words – lunatics, asylum and Bush's announcement concerning 9/11, in particular – as things that he manipulated and distorted by situating them into a single artwork such that their everyday, average semantic significances are manipulated into being something else, namely, ambiguous. An artwork renders one aspect of language incoherent insofar as the words used merely contingently refer to particular objects, and thereby the artwork negates the supposed strength of the total and necessary connection of all of language to that to which it refers. By employing simple sounds that represent their ordinary meaning, but that acquire a different meaning altogether when presented in the artwork, the totalizing structure of language is itself put into question.

Likewise, in her *Revolution in Poetic Language*, Julia Kristeva also discusses how artists use language, but in terms of a distinction between the symbolic realm of language and the semiotic human subject. She claims that "in "artistic" practices the semiotic - the precondition for the symbolic - is revealed as that which also destroys the symbolic".¹³ Semiotically, a person shows up within the totalizing symbolic and social realm of language, and insofar as this occurs, a signifying position is possible.¹⁴ From the standpoint of her own developments of psychoanalysis following Freud, she argues that, from birth, a person is a bundle of “energies” or “drives” that move throughout the body, which together compose one's “chora... [which is a] totality formed by the [instinctual] drives” that endure a

process of assimilation into a community's language, that is, a symbolic realm.¹⁵ The psychic-drives constitutive of the semiotic chora are “simultaneously assimilating and destructive” because they assimilate, on the one hand, to the mother, whose body “mediates the symbolic law organizing social relations and becomes the ordering principle of the semiotic order.”¹⁶ The psychic drive as the death-drive, on the other hand, is destructive insofar as it ruptures into the symbolic realm of the father, that is, language.¹⁷

A human subject positioned within a language enters a “thetic stage” by “break[ing]...the signifying process” of the symbolic realm of language and “establish[es its own]... *identification*...and [that of] its object as “preconditions of propositionality”.”¹⁸ One becomes someone once one has broken into language by first uttering an assertion, rather than merely having assimilated to it through one's mother. This rupture into language is, in part, motivated by the death drive. The symbolic (linguistic) realm, into which the semiotic individual ruptures by speaking, is a tightly woven interconnection of linguistic meanings. What a person asserts is uniquely related to where and when the person ruptures into the linguistic, symbolic realm and is also intimately related to the person's instinctual ways of taking up and signifying (roughly, ways of expression) which are driven by both the death drive and the instinct to assimilate, amongst other various instinctual drives.

Poetry, Kristeva explains, distorts the “signifying chain” of language because it “disturbs” what society accepts as normative ways to signify with particular signifiers.¹⁹ When artworks are produced, the semiotic is positioned within a language, which enables the artist to “call [something] into question...so that a new disposition may be articulated”.²⁰ Artworks function as ruptures of language when they enter into the linguistic, symbolic realm. We saw this before with Sartre. For both Kristeva and Sartre, the artist challenges the normative by making particular aspects of it explicit, but explicit in unconventional ways that disrupt the normative, revealing the absurdity of its apparent, but false concreteness and necessity. This meshes well with Marcuse's claim that revolution occurs only by

violently resisting the institutional forms of society. Every destructive break of language itself holds the possibility of social transformation, but only if the artwork breaks language is it possible that the artwork could invoke revolutionary thoughts on the part of the audience.

Kristeva claims that because there is a tendency of meaning and signification towards becoming dogmatic, poets embrace this dogmatism of meaning and signification as a boundary, and thus can “set in motion what dogma represses.”²¹ In this way, art “takes on murder and moves through it,” she says, by setting up the social-symbolic order for the purpose of killing it.²² Artworks experiment with language to such an extent that they are, as Kristeva describes, like experimental autistic instances that fail to assimilate to the symbolic, which results in our being “drive[n]...to the limits of our identities”.²³ At the limit of our identities, our everyday understanding of the significance of symbolic and linguistic signifiers is distorted and, thus, artworks are potentially terrorizing for us because we are cast out of the comfort zone of the presumed cohesiveness of language. Once an artwork has destroyed some everyday aspect of one's world, one must either reinforce that destroyed world or can turn against it.

In *Answering the Question: What is Postmodernism?*, Lyotard posits that the aim of modern art is to “present the fact that the unrepresentable exists,” while the postmodern is “that which, in the modern, puts forward the unrepresentable in presentation itself”.²⁴ The modern presents the unrepresentable when an artist intentionally produces a void nested in a form, which provides the audience with something to have as a “matter for solace and pleasure,” but, the audience can also realize that there is something missing from the artwork – the void.²⁵ But, the void is present as that which the artwork lacks. The postmodern, on the other hand, does not provide a “matter for solace and pleasure”, but instead denies any consensus of taste that “would make it possible to share collectively the nostalgia for the unattainable”.²⁶ Lyotard points to two possibilities: modern artworks can produce collectively shared experiences when there is a consensus of taste, or the artwork’s presented unrepresentable will not be viewed in the same way by everyone. Miller's rendition of *Re: volution* could do both, depending on the

audience, but in terms of all possible audiences, clearly, what *Re: volution* presents will not be viewed the same way by each person.

Lyotard describes in *That Which Resists, After All* (an interview with Gilbert Laroche) one characteristic of the postmodern as resistance.²⁷ The postmodern is that which resists the modern. When the modern is resisted, that which already exists is put into question because, rather than showing that something does not exist, what does not exist is brought into existence.²⁸ Postmodernity resists and thereby disrupts the totality of accepted norms, values, and institutions by revealing what else can exist.

The common thread between Marcuse, Sartre, Kristeva, and Lyotard should now be evident. As explained above in relation to Sartre and Kristeva, *Re: volution* resists by creating a space for its audience to reflect on who the lunatics of the world are, and, if it happens to be Bush and Blair, then the artwork resists the political regimes of the United Kingdom and the United States. The function of the artwork lies in its production of an ambiguity, which causes discomfort for an audience who typically wanders in average everydayness, but now must make up its own mind about the totality that is put into question. Ambiguity is the means of distorting the totality of repressive political systems and even of language, thus, it is the means of opening up the possibility of discovering meaning outside of totalizing systems and produces the possibility for revolutionary transformation.

Unlike Marcuse, Sartre, Kristeva, and Lyotard, who emphasize experiences of artwork from the standpoint of the subject, Heidegger and Benjamin describe how groups of people together relate to artworks. Their explanations have less to do with the concept of an artwork's putting a totality into question and more to do with the possible political events that could ensue if certain artworks are taken up collectively by a people. Heidegger's explanation is less than opaque: he claims that what happens in the artwork is a happening of truth.²⁹ Truth happens when the artwork, as a thing, presents a world via its thingliness.³⁰ As a thing, an artwork is an earthy element, which is in strife with the world opened up by the artwork such that

The world is the self-disclosing openness of the broad paths of the simple and essential decisions in the destiny of an historical people. The earth is the spontaneous forthcoming of that which is continually self-secluding and to that extent sheltering and concealing.³¹

The strife between world and earth is a “striving” that is not disordered and destructive, but instead the earth and world “raise each other into the self-assertion of their natures”³² In the battle between them, they become distinct only because they stand out as extremes united in tension, which makes possible a world of understanding and possibilities. Preservers are those who enter into the truth happening in the strife taking place between the artwork’s earth concealing character and the world it reveals.³³ The preservers of an artwork experience the world opened up by the artwork as a revealed truth that is a possibility of existence.

Christopher P. Long argues that Martin Heidegger’s *The Origin of the Work of Art* reveals that Heidegger describes how a people can embrace their historical and traditional situatedness via an artwork, and can thereby acquire a unity in relation to the truth expressed by an artwork. Long also shows that Walter Benjamin’s *The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction* concerns the same basic concept as Heidegger puts forth, except that Benjamin is warning us to beware of such artworks because, as propaganda, they can result in atrocity.³⁴ Long states:

While Benjamin emphasizes the emancipator dimensions of the decay of the aura [of artworks due to mechanical reproduction] and employs it against what he saw as the increasing aestheticization of politics by the forces of fascism, Heidegger attempts to reinvigorate the aura [of artworks] in order to secure the possibility of an authentic relation to the origin that would reestablish the spirit and power of the German people.³⁵

As evidence, Long points out that for Heidegger, when a world is disclosed to a people, the “possibility for [a] genuine decision” for that people is presented and they are, from their own historical and traditional situatedness, confronted with the truth happening in the artwork, which they can embrace and utilize as a means to political unification.³⁶

For Heidegger, all art is poetry and the language of poetry is a “projective saying” such that the language of poetry is “the saying of the world and the earth, the saying of the realm of their battle”.³⁷ An artwork is in battle, insofar as it exists as a possible world for an audience. The language of poetry is projective because it reveals a truth by bringing it into Being as a world that historically arises for an audience as a possibility. If the audience fails to properly enter into that truth, then they have not embraced that possible world, and have failed to “recogniz[e] their destiny,...[and to] comport themselves in the proper manner towards the work of art”.³⁸ Heidegger’s claim is that artworks can reveal a possible truth, and that an audience can, by entering into that truth, embrace their historical and traditional situation. The audience can enter the truth revealed by the artwork and bring that world into existence.

Heidegger shows how a people can embrace the truth that happens in an artwork in such a way that they can come to realize themselves as a source and strength of social change. But, the possibility of the world revealed by an artwork is paradoxical insofar as it both could exist, but does also exist, though only in an artwork. Exactly how a number of preservers would enact the world is ambiguous because their taking up that world as a possibility does not guarantee that the world will actually come into existence in the future. As an ambiguous possibility, in this sense, the world must be chosen and acted towards and this can only occur if the average everydayness is disrupted by that group of preservers entering that artwork’s world. Further, a sufficient number of people are required for real transformation to occur. Yet, a group of people would become united, in this sense, only if each person reacted to the ambiguity of the possibility in the same way – each individual would have to take up the possibility in order to bring it into the world, thereby making it exist concretely. The fact that National Socialist propaganda had its successes demonstrates that it is possible that a large number of people can effectively alter their understanding of their existence as a result of some artworks. Despite the problems concerning whether and how an artwork successfully unites a people, though, an artistic

presentation of a world rendered concrete in the artwork, but only possible for the audience, reveals the possibility of social and political change by way of an artwork.

Walter Benjamin, on the other hand, describes how mechanically reproduced artworks, namely films, create a collective subject because the film's audience is forced to react.³⁹ According to Benjamin, the mechanical reproduction of artwork has altered how artworks function because the authority of the original piece of an artwork is undermined by its being mechanically reproduced, but this also makes it possible for an artwork to show up in situations other than that in which it was originally situated.⁴⁰

The authority of an artwork, according to Benjamin, has to do with an artwork's "aura". Mechanical reproduction levels-out objects in the world because there is no longer the "permanence and uniqueness" of the original artwork, so, the artwork's aura decays.⁴¹ An artwork's aura, its authority, decays when the artwork no longer mesmerizes and this occurs as a result of the artwork's mass production.⁴² The artwork is no longer unapproachable, but becomes an object for sale, which anyone can own. The truth revealed by an artwork no longer holds absolute authority over their audiences, but instead, due to the loss of the artwork's authority, a "free floating contemplation" results and agitates the audience to the extent that the audience is "shock[ed]" and "force[d]...to react" autonomously.⁴³ The artwork has lost its authority, but the subject *has to* respond to it. In other words, mass production of an artwork renders the authority of an artwork, its aura, ambiguous and it is this loss of authority which creates the possibility that the audience authoritatively responds.

Coldcut's music video has been mass produced, and it certainly defames British politicians, but because anyone can experience the artwork, its authority has lost its strength and the audience can assert itself against the artwork. Miller's remix, on the other hand, seems to recognize the loss of authority such that instead of making an authoritative claim, the remix more explicitly makes possible the audience's assertion of their own authority. Miller's remix does not assert an authority over us because

what it expresses is ambiguous. If it does have any authority it is only because its ambiguity forces us to react. In the face of such ambiguity, the audience either allows ambiguity to dominate, or aims to define what is happening in the artwork. The audience is led to make a decision, and either does so, or remains indifferent to the artwork's meaning, allowing it to remain ambiguous. No longer mesmerized, the audience can potentially assert itself against the artwork's content or asserts the artwork's content itself. Either way, if a number of people assert themselves for or against the artwork in the same way, a social transformation could result.

As outlined above, it should now be obvious that it is possible for art to function as a catalyst for revolutionary transformation, but the success of an artwork's inspiring revolutionary action cannot be guaranteed. Whether or not revolutionary transformation will follow completely depends on whether or not the audience is effected to such an extent that they are willing to continue negating the presumed necessity of average everydayness, as the artwork does. Art can potentially represent what does not presently exist without conventionally relying on what is readily available to us within the totalizing social system. In fact, artworks can *always destroy* totalizing systems, revealing other possibilities than the average everyday that currently dominates. Thus, an artwork can show an audience a possible mode of existence that it, perhaps, had not considered before. A space into which audiences can enter is opened up that allows for contemplation of social issues that are put into question, and the very questionability of such social issues reveals their contingency, and the possibility of revolutionary transformation.

It is important to point out that, insofar as our lives have a political character, individuals tend to have a decisive political stance before they encounter artworks. For this reason, artworks that merely speak to what individuals already take as being unquestionable and politically correct are impotent and cliché. They will not be catalysts for revolutionary transformations. They assimilate to the totality of Being or to the symbolic, linguistic realm, and they fail to rupture language with something that does not

presently exist or with something that destroys previous ways of signification. Instead, they merely reinforce the average everyday existence of a society.

In conclusion, artworks that merely speak to or reinforce average everyday opinions and norms fail to agitate their audiences to the point of contemplation. Therefore, in order for artworks to truly agitate their audience, they will have to “terrorize” the political preconceptions of their audiences; otherwise, the artworks merely reinforce already held ordinary views. I describe artistic resistance as violent and as a kind of terrorism because of the way it shatters the understanding and expectations of an audience. Like a terrorist who shatters the average everyday community, an artist violently shatters the average everyday, though with less blood-shed. One is brought to a state of discomfort and, at the very least, strained to have to react to something that forcibly puts into question how one thinks the world is and ought to be. Thus, artworks have a revolutionary potential that is less physically harmful, though potentially psychologically disruptive. It is best that we know how to manipulate artworks for these purposes, both so that we can keep in mind that some artworks aim to assimilate us to certain political agendas, but also so that we can utilize art for the purpose of revolutionary transformation.

¹ Marcuse, Herbert. Official Herbert Marcuse Website, “Herbert Marcuse: The End of Utopia and The Problem of Violence” and “The Problem of Violence and the Radical Opposition,” (Lectures given in Berlin, July 1967, and published in *Five Lectures* (Boston: Beacon, 1970)), <http://www.marcuse.org/herbert/pubs/60spubs/67endutopia/67EndUtopiaProbViol.htm#probvio> Accessed, May 19, 2010.

² Ibid. 90.

³ Ibid. 90.

⁴ Ibid. 90.

⁵ YouTube, “Coldcut – Revolution,” WebVideo, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=S6KnJ0k_u7w Accessed May 20, 2010.

⁶ Ninja Tune Records, “Coldcut.” Biography. <http://www.ninjatune.net/ninja/artist.php?id=3> Accessed May 19, 2010.

⁷ Ninja Tune Records, “Coldcut,” Biography, <http://www.ninjatune.net/ninja/release.php?id=524> Accessed May 24, 2010.

⁸ Adbusters: Journal of the Mental Environment, “About Adbusters,” <https://www.adbusters.org/about/adbusters> Accessed May 19, 2009. Matt Black and Johnathon More, “Re:volution,” on *Adbusters: Live without Dead Time*, mixed and produced by Paul Miller. Adbusters, 2003. This is the second song on the CD provided.

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- ⁹ Sartre, Jean-Paul, *Being and Nothingness*, trans. Hazel E. Barnes, (New York: Washington Square Press, 1984), 59.
- ¹⁰ Ibid. 65.
- ¹¹ Sartre, Jean-Paul, "What is Writing?," in *The Continental Aesthetics Reader*, ed. Clive Cazeaux, (New York: Routledge, 2007), 103.
- ¹² Ibid. 104.
- ¹³ Kristeva, Julia, "Revolution in Poetic Language," in *The Portable Kristeva: Updated Edition*, ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), 44.
- ¹⁴ Ibid. 35.
- ¹⁵ Ibid. 35.
- ¹⁶ Ibid. 37.
- ¹⁷ Ibid. 37.
- ¹⁸ Ibid. 40.
- ¹⁹ Ibid. 44.
- ²⁰ Ibid. 45.
- ²¹ Ibid. 49.
- ²² Ibid. 56.
- ²³ Kristeva, Julia, *Revolt, She Said: an Interview with Philippe Petite*, (New York: MIT Press, 2002), 115.
- ²⁴ Lyotard, Jean-Francois, "Answering the Question: What is Postmodernism?," in *The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge*, trans. Regis Durand, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993), 78 & 81.
- ²⁵ Ibid. 81.
- ²⁶ Ibid. 81.
- ²⁷ Lyotard, Jean-Francois, "That Which Resists, After All," *Philosophy Today* 36(4): 414
- ²⁸ Ibid. 414.
- ²⁹ Heidegger, Martin, "Origin of the Work of Art," *The Continental Aesthetics Reader*, ed. Clive Cazeaux, (New York, 2007), 88.
- ³⁰ Ibid. 89-92.
- ³¹ Ibid. 92.
- ³² Ibid. 92.
- ³³ Ibid. 99.

³⁴ Long, Christopher P., "Art's Fateful Hour: Benjamin, Heidegger, Art and Politics," *New German Critique* 83, (Spring-Summer, 2001): 90. Hereafter, I utilize Long's translations of Heidegger and Benjamin's works unless otherwise indicated.

³⁵ Ibid. 90.

³⁶ Ibid. 102.

³⁷ Ibid. 105.

³⁸ Ibid. 108.

³⁹ Ibid. 106.

⁴⁰ Ibid. 90-1.

⁴¹ Ibid. 93.

⁴² Ibid. 93-4.

⁴³ Ibid. 95-7.